Exchange, one of Foulkes's four group–specific therapeutic factors, is a valuable if neglected concept in group analytic literature, standing for the encounter with difference in the group. Groups' multiple poles of difference allow individuals to experience and explore a range of possibilities hitherto unimagined. The clinical dimensions of exchange are explored through the metaphor of the mother/baby dyad; identity formation in a specific cultural context grounded in familial and group identifications are also touched upon. In the group these together allow for the creation, and recreation, of individual identity.

Key words: exchange, difference, information, identity, identification

Introduction
What it is in groups that helps us find or fashion something new in ourselves? People in groups typically mention the experience of finding common ground – 'I realized I wasn't the only one who feels like this' – an important recognition, but in itself not enough.

Group members seem to discover alternatives to long–repeated patterns – history need not be destiny. Transformational experiences in groups can be observed, again and again, to arise from the encounter with difference.

Further, the transformative potential of a group seems to be directly correlated with the degree of difference that its members are able to recognize, and tolerate, in each other. This paper traces the encounter with difference, and its role in the expansion of identity (ego training in action) in analytic groups. I follow Foulkes in starting with the group as a process in communication, rather than a thing.

Psychology is. . . neither 'individual' nor 'group', except by abstraction. We cannot speak about the individual without reference to the group, nor about a human group that does not consist of individuals. Both are, therefore, abstractions as far as psychology of the total person is concerned. (Foulkes 1990, p.230)

The Metaphor of Dyadic Development as a Therapeutic Tool
Cox and Theilgaard eloquently explore the mutative potential of metaphor, noting along the way that its literal meaning of allowing one thing to stand for another, is identical to that of transference (1987, p.92). Thinking of analytic theory as metaphor helps one think about which perspectives particular patients may find illuminating. Foulkes's broad–brush theoretical outline sustains the simultaneous presence of a plurality of metaphors: a ‘group of theories’ can be present in the room, in the mind of the conductor.

Pines notes the ubiquity in psychoanalytic writing, of the idea of mirroring within the mother/infant
dyad (in the context of noting how rarely Foulkes is credited for the idea). The idea is so useful that it is easy to overlook its metaphorical nature. It fits too with all the group analytic metaphors of the group as matrix in the sense of ‘containing mother’.

**Exchange and Its Relationship to Mirroring**

Foulkes (1964) is characteristically terse about exchange, and contrasts its presence in the group setting with its absence in psychoanalysis:

> ‘Explanations and information, for which there is a great demand and surprising interest, are of course not peculiar to the group situation, but in one respect there is a significant difference: that is the element of exchange. This not only makes discussion more lively and full, but alters the emotional situation, just as children accept many things from each other which they would oppose if they came from their parents.’ (p. 34)

He later adds:

> To [the foundation matrix] their closer acquaintance and their intimate exchanges add consistently, so that they also form a current, ever-moving, ever-developing dynamic matrix.‘ (1990, p.228: Italics in original)¹

Zinkin (1994) muses about the currency of exchange; perhaps, paying attention to ‘intimate exchange’ in the matrix, the currency is intimacy? A patient in the final session of a group commented: ‘I know you all better than my mother or father’. Trevarthen (1977, p.241) shows that communication is something humans value for its own sake. ‘It is difficult to perceive any content in the communication except the exchange (my italics) itself – it is essentially phatic.’

Through the intimate encounter, constraints acquired in the family of origin (the superego, in another idiom) are softened by repeated exposure to the differing constraints of others. Zinkin notes the link with mirroring:


> ‘Mirroring can only take place if identification remains incomplete. . . I can only exchange something with you if there is some degree of sameness, some matching between what I give you and what you give me.’ (ibid)

Compared to mirroring, exchange has been overlooked, perhaps ‘mirroring’ Foulkes’s non–elaboration. I believe exchange is frequently subsumed within the concept of ‘mirroring’. Pines is a rich example, with a complex concept of mirroring, including the importance of difference:

> It is difference that carries information, and difference is only understandable in a context. Without difference there is no change and no development. Bateson (in Steps to an ecology of mind, 1972) points out that information is news of difference (my italics) and for this there must be two entities. The mirror conveys identity. . . but in normal healthy development mirroring reflects difference. (Pines, 1998(a), page 27)
Here the notion of the group providing a context for self-development which encompasses and extends the early dyadic relationship, is central to the elucidation of mirroring.

**Beyond Simple Mirroring: The Importance of Difference**

A true mirror can only reflect an identical image, whereas the concept of mirroring in analytic writing includes the encounter with ‘other’. Trevarthen’s research into pre-verbal communication between mothers and babies confirms the notion of a complex exchange.

‘Imitation is certainly not passive incorporation of ‘new’ experiences; it is more a remodelling and integration of components already in spontaneous expression’ (Trevarthen, 1979, p.332).

*Trevanthen, 1977, p.241*

There would be nothing therapeutic in a group where everyone was the same – if indeed such a group were conceivable. Foulkes (1990) notes the advantage for patients:

‘They begin to see for themselves that other people laugh about different things, feel different, are different – and yet there is no reason to judge one kind of behaviour as better or more normal than the other, except for reasons valid in the greater community... In what people differ, therein lies their true individuality.’ (p.232)

It is the experiencing of something the same, yet different, and constructing from it a personally meaningful version – a modified identity – that is, a crucial therapeutic factor. Zinkin says ‘both gain in the process by acquiring something that did not previously exist, except in another person. Each has gained in no longer being split off from what only the other seemed to have possessed.’ (1994, p.115)

**Exchange as the Encounter with Difference**

If exchange is an encounter with what is other, different or new, mirroring is then primarily an experience of similarity, (including negative mirroring, which is a denial of similarity). In other words, mirroring is the experience of ‘like’ and ‘not like’, whereas exchange is the experience of ‘other than’. The advantage lies in this differentiation: in the healing experience of recognition, patients can distinguish what is held in common from what is uniquely their own. I suggest that Foulkes gifted us this, albeit with little elaboration, in his concept of ‘exchange’. Foulkes speaks of the exchange of ‘information’. If, following Bateson, information is ‘news of difference’, Foulkes’s view of the importance of exchange (as one of the four fundamental group–specific therapeutic factors) becomes comprehensible and is greatly enriched.²

*Foulkes, 1990, p.115, Bateson, 1972, p.97*

**Clinical Example of Exchange as Therapeutic Encounter with Difference**

Alfie, Judy and Pete were discussing sexual concerns. Alfie expressed frustration at his wife’s reluctance to make love; Judy her shame about having sexual feelings, and her desire for, and fear of, an intimate relationship; Pete his loneliness and desire for a sexual partner.
The following week, Judy says, 'It's funny how something comes up in therapy and then comes up in your life. I felt quite liberated after last week – you don't often get the chance to talk about sex without it getting embarrassing or smuttty. I hadn't realized that I still had some of my mother's ideas. At the weekend I went to see my friend Mary; on Saturday evening we walked along the seafront, two young women looking good. All the men were looking at us. I really enjoyed it.'

Louise doesn't want sex with her husband because she resents his neglect, and Alfie links this to his frustration with his wife. When I observe to Louise that sibling–like rivalries in marriage can thwart sexual relationship, she turns to Alfie, 'That's true for you too, isn't it?' The ensuing discussion of needs in marriage has far–reaching consequences for Louise over the next year, while Alfie receives coaching in communicating with his wife.

Pete's desire for a partner and envy of couples are delicately addressed by the group; the gap between the fantasy and reality of love relationships is ruefully acknowledged. Pete subsequently joins a dating agency; and begins to address his shyness by taking on a more public role in his professional life.

Information as ‘News of Difference’

The differing problems of group members allowed an ‘exchange’ of perspectives from which all gained. Understanding ‘information’ as ‘news of difference’, we can find thus see exchange at all four levels of group interaction.

At its most basic, the thing that is being communicated is information. Not information in the passive sense of ‘description’, but information in a more active sense of precipitating change. (Dalal 1998, p.223).

This links with Zinkin's (1994) description of exchange at the projective level. The perceived level of exchange is unimportant, since the everyday may stand for the most profound of encounters.

'Depth is always there: it is always possible to get hold of it on the surface, it is there all through, visible and tangible. It depends who is looking, who is listening; one need not jump from what is going on to what is behind it.' (Foulkes, 1990, p.280)

Identification and differentiation are fundamental to the experience of self and other, first and most powerfully between mother and baby: 'in the act of identifying with someone or something, someone else or something else is excluded’ (Padel 1985). Relationships within the family are the earliest through which information is encountered. In group analysis, the encounter with others' new information, gives an alternative to what was originally transmitted within the birth family; exchange is the medium of the experience of difference. ‘Explanation’, like ‘information’ in Bateson’s sense, may stand for an experience of another way of seeing.

Clinical Example of ‘Explanation’ as the Medium of Exchange

Judy, had previously been considering beginning a sexual relationship with a friend, Mike; she had been absent the previous week. She explains that she had gone home from work with an upset stomach, intending to come to the group, but had fallen asleep and missed the time.
She recounts an earlier telephone conversation with Mike. He had phoned to say that he had just become a father; initially shocked, afterwards she felt extremely angry and hurt, that Mike had treated her 'like trash'.

Judy: I think that's really dishonest, inviting me to go away with him when he was having a baby with someone else. (to me) Don't you think it's dishonest?

Pause

Louise: It could be cowardice – he could have been afraid to tell you because he knew what effect it would have. When he couldn't avoid telling you any longer, he rang you up.

Judy: Yes – he might have been ashamed.

There followed an exploration of Mike’s possible motives, and the implication that shame might indicate a high value for Judy. Louise offers an alternative ‘explanation’ of Mike’s behaviour which allows Judy to explore her own reactions, recognizing identifications based on repetitions of early relational experiences, with father (abandonment and associated feelings of worthlessness), mother (being kept uninformed and powerless), and as a daughter whose father denied her existence. She also associates her anger with envy arising from her frustrated desire for a child. Her feeling tone now was far different from the insistent rage/pain with which she began.

A clarification of her feelings of disappointment leads her to identify her unconscious use of Mike as a ‘fantasy relationship’ which protected her from the risk of a real one. She valued his protectiveness, but no longer wanted a kindly father figure for love – she was ready for something different.

Louise’s explanation, simple enough in itself (and supported by evidence in Judy's account) allowed a different view to enter. The example is commonplace, in the sense that one could find comparable exchanges in any group session. It is this very universality which leads to the invisibility of their transformational impetus. It isn’t that one such exchange effects ‘Damascus Road’ change in individuals. It is the continuous iterative process of taking in a different ‘explanation’, with its implications.

The transformational potential of a group experience depends on optimum balance of mirroring (recognition of sameness) and exchange (recognition of difference) at the deepest levels of the psyche; the greater tolerance of difference shifting the balance as the group matures. The cumulative ‘specificity’ and ‘interlocking’ of these processes produce resonances at unconscious levels. (Foulkes 1990, p.228).

Unspoken Exchange: Attunement and the Holding of Preverbal Needs

Foulkes tells us that ‘All phenomena in an analytic therapeutic group are considered as potential communications.’ (1990, p.226). We may receive ‘mental or subjective information (my italics) – information about feelings, intentions and the contents of awareness’ (Trevarthen 1977, pp.232–233).
These unspoken exchanges are an important part of the therapeutic process, as some patients experience chronic difficulty in ‘putting it into words’ (Rogers, 1987). The concept of exchange can give us a language for patients’ unspoken use of the group and the therapist for healing. The group has the (maternal) role of containing the silence; silence does not always indicate withdrawal. Zinkin (1998, p.218) notes: ‘the best moments of a group are when people respond to the speech of the other, even when no words are uttered (my italics). There are innumerable examples of this in the life of a group; weeks later something said previously may be mentioned, together with the thoughts it has provoked.

**Exchange in the Early Months of Life: Reciprocal Patterning of Similarity and Difference**

In the dyadic interaction, the reciprocal patterning is largely non–verbal. Padel (1985) notes that

> ‘Exchange in that first relationship is of far more than milk and bodily contacts: there is acknowledgement of feelings and of mutuality in feeling, and there is reciprocal observation.’

(p. 275)

Facial expression, eye contact and gestures are important elements of communication (Trevarthen 1977, p.248). Trevarthen understands this as innate, since two month olds, blind from birth, will smile to a voice or tickling. (1979, p.326) Eye contact is definitive (1979, p.330; Gough, 1962) in infants communicating with their mothers and others.

Exchange is of value in itself to both adult and infant, independent of any content (Trevarthen 1977, p.238: my italics). Trevarthen remarks that you cannot talk about anything to babies – the communication is (only) (about) the relationship. ‘However rich and satisfying in itself, communication with an infant under six months. . . is preoccupied with intersubjectivity itself.’ (1977, p.254)

This sheds light on those patients for whom our beautifully turned interpretations are relevant only in their expression, and what it conveys of our intentions toward them. The content, at this stage, is not at all the point: we might as well talk ‘baby talk’. Much is unspoken, as communication here is eye contact, gesture, or at the boundaries of the group. Although this silence may be resistance, it is the resistance of incapacity. Verbal communication, Stern’s (1985) final developmental stage, is, for the moment, beyond these patients. It may be achieved, if the group can allow the space in which to complete earlier developmental steps.

**First Example: Robert**

Robert joined the group following panic attacks. He would share practical information, and sometimes became the group’s ‘patient’. He often sat silent and watchful, listening as others explored emotional responses, and commented that such conversation was quite new to him. He was held in (sometimes exasperated) affection.

He silently used the group to understand and develop a love relationship, and began to speak about it; he became more able to express his feelings, in the group and with his girlfriend. When the relationship ended, Robert was unable to face the depths of his pain. Since his panic attacks and depression had abated, he decided to ‘move on’.
Our communications, and those of other group members receiving no immediate response, are not however unimportant. They may succeed in communicating ‘A solicitous or caring intent, leading to watchful gentleness. . . a specific, assisting form of intersubjectivity.’ (Trevarthen 1979, p.337). Winnicott observes that some patients ‘need us to be able to give them a capacity to use us. This for them is the analytic task.’ (1971, p.94)

Trevarthen’s ‘watchful gentleness’ seems close to ‘the analyst’s fundamental unintrusiveness’ of which Bollas writes; the patient appreciates it ‘not because it leads to freedom of association, but because it feels like the kind of relating that is needed to become well’. (Trevarthen 1979, p.23); it is also close to Colin James’s marrying of Winnicott’s concept ‘holding’ (1994) and Bion’s concept ‘containing’ with Foulkes’s concept of the individual within the group matrix.4

The Development of Verbal Communication
Researchers such as Trevarthen and Stern enrich our understanding of the pre–verbal behaviours which are part of a group’s dynamic matrix. Stern (1985) sets out to integrate developmental psychology’s observation of the infant, with psychoanalytic perspectives.

He traces the infant’s developing sense of self through four stages (emergent, core, subjective and verbal), providing a working model for the layers of personal identity. All stages of the self are simultaneously operative in the adult: achieving a stage does not imply leaving behind the achievements of an earlier one. For example, ‘all learning and all creative acts begin in the domain of emergent relatedness. This domain alone is concerned with the coming–into–being that is at the heart of creating and learning’ (Stern, 1985, p.67). These ‘aha’ moments relate to the earliest stage of development, long before speech, yet form an ordering process central to learning.

In the development of the ‘subjective self’, the healthy infant is already skilled at ‘affect exchange’. The role of attunement in interpersonal communication is critical: ‘feeling stages that are never attuned to will be experienced only alone, isolated from the interpersonal context of shareable experience. What is at stake here is nothing less than the shape of and extent of the shareable inner universe.’ (Stern, 1985, p.151–152)

Second Example: Maeve
Maeve was determinedly ‘social’ at the start of sessions, thereafter often silent, with strong eye contact with me. She tended to absent herself when the group came close to her feelings. After eighteen months her suicidal despair had abated, she had found a job, visited Disneyland with her sons, and begun to make some limited plans for the future. At first rather neglected, her appearance improved, and other members congratulated her on her glamorous haircut for her 60th birthday.

I hoped she would say more about her deeper feelings, unwilling to accept that for Maeve, improved and stable functioning might be ‘as good as it gets’. After two years in the group, her attendance improved and she began to articulate some difficulties. This however exacerbated her dilemma. Having clarified her fear of her deeper feelings and the nature of her defences, after three years she left without ‘putting it into words’.
Nitsun warns against over-optimism in treatment (1996, p.7), and Maeve was a patient for whom I wanted more than she could envisage for herself.

**The Double-edged Sword of Language**

In an interesting parallel to Foulkes’s understanding of the group, Vygotsky (1962) drew attention to the relation of thought and word – ‘not a thing but a process’ (p.125), and noted the changes thought undergoes as it turns into speech. ‘It does not merely find expression in speech: it finds in it reality and form.’ (p.126). He clarifies the bifurcation of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ dialogue in the developing child:

‘a child’s thought, precisely because it is born as a dim, amorphous whole, must find expression in a single word. As his thought becomes more differentiated, the child is less apt to express it in single words.’ (p.126).

Stern elucidates:

*The infant’s initial interpersonal knowledge is mainly unshareable, amodal, instance-specific and attuned to nonverbal behaviours in which no one channel of communication has privileged status with regard to accountability or ownership. With (language) infants become estranged from direct contact with their own personal experience. . . But also with language, infants for the first time can share their personal experience of the world with others, including ‘being with’ others in intimacy, isolation, loneliness, awe, fear and love.’ (Stern, 1985, p.182)

The development of a language for what has never before been able to be shared can sometimes be seen in group exchanges. As feeling states are recognized and put into words, the ‘shareable inner universe’ expands.

**Third Example: Jed**

Articulate and engaging, Jed formed a good attachment to me in assessment, then experienced the group as ‘useless’ and was withdrawn and silent, though with occasional expressive eye contact with me. He communicated his inarticulate rage and despair; in part I believe the profound despair of some other members, was too resonant. He expressed the intention of leaving after both the first two breaks in the group (each of one week only), but, with much persuasion, managed to stay.

By two-thirds of the way through (a 32-week group) he could endure breaks and began to put his difficulties into words. He expressed his frustration that he had not done this more, while acknowledging his achievement in staying in the group and beginning to value it. Another member, Jeb, asked whether if Jed had shared his true feelings earlier he would have got further. In the final session Jed said he had thought a lot about this, and that this pattern of waiting too long was ‘the story of his life’.

Attunement is unspoken exchange always underpinning the work of ‘putting it into words’. Foulkes (1990, p.274) comments:

’insofar as transference is a revival of an infantile relationship. It can only be understood as the repetition of the earliest mother/child relationship which we produce in psychoanalysis. From that
point of view we start with the deepest level of regression, and from the beginning our treatment is also a form of weaning.’

Attunement allows us to work with preverbal deprivations and may be particularly important in the early stages of therapy.

Identity in Elias
So far we have been concerned with exchange as part of developing identity, in infants and in analytic groups. It is also central to Elias’s theme of human development. Elias communicates the ineluctably shared nature of our being, how we inevitably form individual identities as variations on a theme. Identity is formed in each individual by the internalization of innumerable interactions and identifications with others, modifying and clarifying the sense of self.

A child develops into a human being only by becoming part of a group, for example by learning a language which was there before him, or by acquiring a civilisatory canon of instinct and affect control. This is not only indispensable for communal life with others, but also for living with oneself, for developing into a human individual and for survival. (Elias, 1992, p.18)

‘The psychological process of ‘growing up’ in Western societies... is nothing other than the individual civilising process to which each young person... is automatically subjected from earliest childhood.’ (Elias, 2000, xi)

Foulkes’s thinking about groups provides a link between the two scales in Elias’ thinking, the human/societal and the individual. In The group as matrix of the individual’s mental life (written in 1973), he summarizes his own contribution to thinking about mind:

‘It seems difficult for many at the present time to accept the idea that what is called ‘the mind’ consists of interacting processes between a number of closely linked persons, commonly called a group... When a group of people... form intimate relationships, they create a new phenomenon, namely, the total field of mental happening between them all... I do not talk of a group mind because this is a substantivation of what is meant and as unsatisfactory as speaking of an individual mind. The mind is not a thing which exists but a series of events, moving and proceeding all the time. (1990, p.224)

Freud (1921) told us that ‘social psychology is the oldest psychology’. Foulkes goes much further. He introduces a paradigm shift which, he reflects ruefully, raises resistances ‘comparable to those found by Freud against the recognition of unconscious mental processes in the individual.’ (Foulkes, 1990, p.225); Elias had predicted Foulkes’s difficulty:

People to whom it seems self–evident that their own self (or their own ego, or whatever else it may be called) exists, as it were, ‘inside’ them, isolated from all the other people and things ‘outside’, have difficulty assigning significance to all those facts which indicate that individuals live from the first in interdependence with others... The civilising process cannot be understood so long as one clings to this type of self–perception. (2000, p.471, 476).
The societal context of the family matrix is inevitably reproduced in the group, so that dysfunction developed in a particular familial context can be modified:

‘In the group setting, the impact with concrete forms of social reality is immediate. . . adaptation to social reality is a fluid one, because it is variously personified by one patient or another, the group as a whole, or by the therapist.’ (Foulkes 1948, p.162)

Identity is not fixed, but ‘a phenomenon that is embedded in a network of social interactions and relations.’ (Dalal, 1998, p.190) Exchange (the encounter with difference) is the central mechanism of this process.

**Ubiquity of Exchange**

Exchange is so much the bread and butter of our groups that we scarcely notice it. It becomes almost invisible, ‘an embarrassingly rich source of information’ (Zinkin 1994, p.108,). This leads to a real difficulty in thinking and writing about it.

Exchange is an iterative process, and reciprocal. It is the repetition of the process which allows it to take hold at deeper levels, rather like the repeated experiences of Stern’s infant which creates internal structures. In analytic groups, exchanges impossible in the individuals’ original development become available, so that members can ‘discover’ in each other new possibilities and greater freedom, within and beyond the group setting. Identity must firm again, modified by the experience of the group: we cannot actually live in the fluidity of a post–structuralist universe (Dalal,1998, p.191).

**Conclusion**

‘Every gardener since Adam has seen the work of previous gardeners. There is no escaping their influence; our ancestors conceived the language of gardening which we cannot avoid speaking. On the other hand, there is a great deal of difference between imitating an idea and letting it play on the subconscious until an apparently new idea emerges. Which is surely what we mean when we say ‘influence’. Tradescant, The Garden, Royal Horticultural Society, January 2001.

Here, in another idiom, is a fair description of what we mean when we say ‘exchange’. The individual in the group takes in from the others in the group (including the conductor) different ways of being, seeing and acting which broaden the range available to her/him in the real world. Not that we always see this happening; it is partly or wholly unconscious. In the complex and fluid dynamic of group interactions, it can be hard at times to know what belongs to whom. Yeats catches something of the easy fluidity which characterizes ‘free–floating discussion’ in a group:

> O chestnut tree, great–rooted blossomer,  
> Are you the lead, the blossom or the bole?  
> O body swayed to music, O brightening glance,  
> How can we know the dancer from the dance? (Yeats, 1990, p.263, verse viii)

Groups work because we can loosen our identity by taking in a broader range of identifications, that is, a new range of possibilities from others, and reform in ourselves a more functional and
adaptive ‘identity’ for the current demands of our lives. Like Nitsun (1996, p.2) I had noticed that the processes in therapeutic groups did not seem different in kind from processes in other groups: for example, in professional development groups, the outcome of greater flexibility in members. It was this universality which first drew my attention to the concept of exchange. I had often wondered whether the process has something to do with ‘borrowing’ from others in the group, so was delighted to find in Pines (1998(a), p.68) a quote from Merleau–Ponty:

*I borrow myself from others; man is a mirror for man.*

In groups we can sometimes experience ourselves as points of consciousness in process, allowing greater acceptance of the conflicting affects, ideas and impulses we find within; encounter with the different experiences of others allows us access to our identity as process.

**Notes**

1. Colin James (1994) notes ‘Despite Foulkes’s concern about the social context of man’s experience, he does not, it seems to me, answer the essential question of the internal representation of these relationships’ (p62). I think Foulkes has explained this: ‘as group analysts we do not share the psychoanalytical juxtaposition of an ‘internal’ psychological reality and an ‘external’, physical or social reality.’ Foulkes then explores the difference of function of the competing ‘abstractions’ represented by the psychoanalytic and group analytic viewpoint.

2. It makes sense of Zinkin’s struggle with Foulkes’s original formulation of exchange. Zinkin is unhappy with ‘explanations’ as the only medium – there are also, for instance, ‘interpretations, insight, moving experiences, perceptions, intuitions, phantasies, or memories.’

3. Dalal distinguishes between ‘the intellectual act of categorization’ and ‘the emotional act of splitting’ which ‘represses the fact that there was ever a connection between the divided.’ He adds ‘I think that errors arise in sometimes equating splitting with the act of division.’ To recognise difference is distinct from, though it may appear similar to, splitting.

4. Nitsun (1996) also writes of the group as ‘the container that helps transform incoherent and unconscious perceptions into coherent thought’ (p.123. 5 Stern, 1985, p.162

**References**


